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SUMMARY
President Donald Trump’s environmental policies appear detrimental to the environmental justice (EJ) movement, but little work has been done to test their true impact on EJ. This Article offers a method for evaluating
progress (or lack thereof) across the last three presidential administrations, proposing three metrics for progress: access to legal recourse, consideration of climate change as an EJ issue, and signaling actions. Using
Robert Kuehn’s taxonomy of EJ, it concludes that while not much may be said to have actually been gained or
lost in terms of distributive or corrective justice, significant progress was made toward procedural and social
justice under President Barack Obama and lost under President Trump. This comparison helps to resolve
competing narratives and provides a framework to encourage further comparisons across additional metrics.

S

ince taking office in January 2017, President Donald
Trump has proposed or completed rollbacks of nearly
100 environmental regulations, repeatedly rejected
calls for action on climate change, and continuously
sought to cut funding for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and particularly for environmental
justice (EJ).1 Given that poor and minority communities
have historically borne a disproportionate amount of environmental burden2 and are expected to be most severely
impacted by climate change,3 these regressive policies seem
likely to harm these same communities most, especially
as they followed what many saw as promising EJ progress
under President Barack Obama.4 But since many of the
climate regulations enacted under President Obama were

rescinded before they had a chance to create any measurable impact,5 and the U.S. Congress has largely ignored the
president’s calls for cuts to funding,6 how are these policy
changes actually impacting the cause of EJ? How can we
assess actual progress toward the multifaceted goals of EJ
over the past 20 years?
While others have evaluated the progress and setbacks
made by individual administrations toward achieving EJ,7
the absence of a universal understanding of the goals of the
movement8 and clear, reported metrics across administrations9 have made an assessment of progress across adminis5.
6.
7.

Author’s Note: Special thanks to Prof. Michael Pappas for
his patient guidance and encouragement.
1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Sections II.B.3, II.C.3.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.B.
See, e.g., Uma Outka & Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Reversing Course on Environmental Justice Under the Trump Administration, 54 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 393 (2019) (arguing that the Trump Administration has set back the
cause of EJ); Brie D. Sherwin, The Upside Down: A New Reality for Science
at the EPA and Its Impact on Environmental Justice, 27 N.Y.U. Env’t L.J.
57 (2019) (arguing that the Trump Administration’s attack on science and
reduced enforcement of environmental laws have particular consequences
for communities already impacted by environmental injustice).
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8.
9.

See infra Section II.B.3.
See infra note 209.
See, e.g., Maurie Cohen, George W. Bush and the Environmental Protection
Agency: A Midterm Appraisal, 17 Soc’y & Nat. Resources 69 (2004) (evaluating progress made during the George W. Bush Administration); Benjamin
Wilson et al., The State of Environmental Justice: An Obama Administration
Retrospective, 47 ELR 10385 (May 2017) (examining progress made during
the Obama Administration); Jeanne Zokovitch Paben, Plan EJ 2014: Fact
or Fiction? A Critique of the Obama Administration’s Efforts on Environmental
Justice, 41 Wm. & Mary Env’t L. & Pol’y Rev. 1 (2016) (same); Marianne
Engelman Lado, No More Excuses: Building a New Vision of Civil Rights
Enforcement in the Context of Environmental Justice, 22 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc.
Change 281, 301-06 (2019) (critiquing the “measured steps forward during the Obama administration” as “too little, too late”); Outka & Warner,
supra note 4 (examining the reversal of progress under President Trump);
Sherwin, supra note 4 (same).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
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trations difficult. This Article builds on previous literature
by proposing three alternative metrics for progress, and
evaluating the actions of the George W. Bush, Obama,
and Trump Administrations on each using Robert Kuehn’s
influential four-part taxonomy of EJ.10 By identifying specific metrics for comparison and applying a comprehensive
framework for evaluation, the Article helps to reconcile
competing narratives: that the Trump Administration has
completely destroyed the progress made toward EJ under
the Obama Administration; and that there was no real
substantive progress there to reverse.
As the analysis below shows, whether EJ has been
advanced or hindered by recent administrations depends
in part on the notion of justice (distributive, procedural,
corrective, or social) considered. Throughout all three
administrations, actual progress toward distributive and
corrective justice, best embodied here by the metric of
access to legal recourse, has remained fairly limited. Thus,
the Trump Administration has had little impact on these
limited EJ gains. The most apparent EJ progress during the
three administrations was made under President Obama,
in the form of procedural and social justice, embodied here
by consideration of climate change as an EJ issue and public signaling of a commitment to EJ. It was these advances,
which were primarily procedural and social, that were lost
by the reversal of course under President Trump.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a basic
history of the EJ movement and an introduction to Kuehn’s
four-part taxonomy of EJ. Part II begins with an explanation
of the difficulties encountered when comparing EJ efforts
across administrations, then identifies the three alternative
metrics examined here, assessing each in light of Kuehn’s
taxonomy: Section II.A compares availability of legal
recourse for EJ claims; Section II.B compares each administration’s consideration of climate change and its impacts
on EJ communities; and Section II.C compares administrative actions that functionally signal the importance of
the issues, such as proposed funding for EJ, involvement
in the Environmental Justice Interagency Working Group
(EJ IWG), and consideration of EJ in rulemaking. Part III
summarizes the impacts of executive actions by the Bush,
Obama, and Trump Administrations, concluding that the
most significant setbacks under the Trump Administration
are to the procedural and social aspects of EJ.
Where the Obama Administration demonstrated an
increased commitment to the EJ movement, publicly recognizing the underlying social and economic inequities
that drive environmental injustice and seeking to actively
involve affected communities in implementing changes,
the Trump Administration has actively backed away from
this commitment and disavowed this recognition. Such
actions represent a loss in their own right, and also a loss
toward achieving more substantive distributive and corrective justice in the future.

10. See generally Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ELR
10681 (Sept. 2000).
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I.

Background

What has become known as the EJ movement has
addressed a broad range of concerns over the years and has
never had one universally agreed-upon meaning, but has
instead been said to mean “many things to many people.”11
Given the movement’s broad and diverse roots, explained
in brief below, this Article adopts Kuehn’s taxonomy of EJ
as a framework for understanding the movement’s goals
and assessing the impacts of federal government actions
across the Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations.

A.

History and Meaning of EJ

At its most basic, the term “environmental justice” refers
to a set of concerns that examine “the relationship of environmental quality to race and class.”12 More specifically,
EJ is often described as addressing the unequal distribution of environmental benefits and burdens, where the
burden is disproportionally borne by poor communities
and communities of color, while the benefits are disproportionately enjoyed by wealthier, whiter communities.13
Importantly, however, the EJ movement is at its heart a
grassroots one, in which progress has most often been
driven by affected communities themselves,14 and is thus
not only concerned with a fair outcome, but also with fair
participation and treatment.15
11. Id. at 10681.
12. Id.
13. See generally Exec. Order No. 12898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprinted as
amended in 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1994 & Supp. VI 1998) [hereinafter Exec.
Order No. 12898] (identifying “an agency-wide environmental justice
strategy” as one that “identifies and addresses disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income populations”); see
also Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10388 (explaining that “while EJ is absolutely about reducing and minimizing the risk of exposure to pollution
and those bad impacts, it’s also about equal access to the good, to services
and amenities”).
14. Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental Laws and Justice, 47 Am. U. L. Rev. 221, 226 (1997) (describing
“most of the participants in the environmental justice movement [as] community groups engaging in local action within their communities”); see
also Robert D. Bullard, Race and Environmental Justice in the United States,
18 Yale J. Int’l L. 319, 329 (1993) (crediting grassroots groups not only
for the pressure they put on EPA, but also for direct action that has forced
changes in policy).
15. See, e.g., EJnet.org, Principles of Environmental Justice, http://www.ejnet.
org/ej/principles.html (last modified Apr. 6, 1996) [hereinafter Principles
of Environmental Justice] (developed at the first National People of Color
Environmental Leadership Summit and affirming, among other things,
“the fundamental right to political, economic, cultural and environmental
self-determination of all peoples” and demanding, among other things, “the
right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision-making”);
see also Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10688 (identifying “procedural justice,”
or “focus[ing] on the fairness of the decision-making process, rather than
on its outcome,” as one of the four dimensions of justice the EJ movement seeks to address); Kaswan, supra note 14, at 223 (identifying “political justice,” or “justice in the decision-making processes that determine
the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens,” as one of the two
forms of justice raised by the EJ movement); Robert D. Bullard, United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Environment,
and Morality: Confronting Environmental Racism in the United
States 6 (2014) (identifying “procedural equity,” defined as “the extent to
which governing rules, regulations, evaluation criteria and enforcement are
applied uniformly and in a non-discriminatory way,” as one of the three equities inherent in EJ); David Schlosberg, Reconceiving Environmental Justice:
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One common view of the EJ movement is that it was
grounded in the civil rights movement.16 During the
1960s, “individuals, primarily people of color, who sought
to address the inequity of environmental protection in
their communities . . . sounded the alarm about the public
health dangers for their families, their communities and
themselves.”17 Early awareness primarily focused on the
disproportionate siting of locally undesirable land uses,
such as waste facilities, in poor and minority communities.18 In 1982, a nonviolent action protesting the siting of
a toxic waste landfill in the predominantly African-American community of Warren County, North Carolina, was
one of the first cases to gain national attention.19 While
unsuccessful in stopping construction of the landfill, the
protest sparked national conversation about the unequal
distribution of environmental burdens and prompted the
U.S. General Accounting Office (now the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)) to study environmental racism for the first time.20
The GAO report and a subsequent report by the United
Church of Christ Commission on Racial Justice established
for the first time a clear correlation between race and the
siting of hazardous waste facilities.21 Though such studies
did not necessarily prove causality, they were viewed as evidence “that siting decisions were at worst discriminatory,
[or] at best disproportionate.”22 In either case, advocates
argued that “[t]he result of these patterns is that minorities
pay the pollution costs of industrial production, while the
benefits accrue to society in general.”23
Some scholars have also credited “a variety of other
social movements,” such as the anti-toxics movement, the
movement for Native American sovereignty, and the labor
movement, for helping to shape the EJ movement.24 The
anti-toxics movement, for example, “came to view discrete
toxic assaults as part of an economic structure” that favored
corporate power and lent its vision for dismantling such
structures to the EJ movement25; while Native American

16.

17.

18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Global Movements and Political Theories, 13 Env’t Pol. 517, 528 (2004)
(identifying “participation” as a key element of EJ).
Clifford J. Villa, Environmental Justice for a New Era 8 (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Luke W. Cole, Environmental
Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David’s Sling, 21 Fordham Urb. L.J.
523, 530 (1994); U.S. EPA, Environmental Justice, https://www.epa.gov/
environmentaljustice (last updated Oct. 22, 2020).
U.S. EPA, supra note 16. See also Bullard, supra note 15, at 21 (“The environmental justice movement emerged in response to environmental inequities, threats to public health, unequal protection, differential enforcement
and disparate treatment received by the poor and people of colour.”).
U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
Id. See also Villa, supra note 16, at 4-5.
U.S. EPA, supra note 16; GAO, GAO/RCED-83-168, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and Their Correlation With Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities (1983).
See generally GAO, supra note 20 (one of the first studies establishing this
connection); Commission for Racial Justice, United Church of
Christ, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States xiii (1987) (finding “race to be the most significant among variables tested in association
with the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities”).
Frank P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §9.10 (2019).
Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race Discrimination, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. 271, 273 (1992).
Luke W. Cole & Sheila R. Foster, From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement 19-30 (2001).
Id. at 23.
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struggles for sovereignty and the labor movement, particularly the fight for farmworkers’ rights, “helped define one
of [the movement’s] central philosophies, the concept of
self-determination.”26
By the late 1980s, various citizen groups were springing up around the country in response to EJ issues. West
Harlem Environmental Action (WE ACT) was founded
in 1987 to improve environmental and health quality in
communities of color.27 In 1990, “the Indigenous Environmental Network (IEN) was formed by grassroots Indigenous peoples and individuals to address environmental and
economic justice issues by building economically sustainable communities”; and the Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice was formed to “empower
communities and workers to impact local, state, regional,
national, and international policy on environmental and
economic justice issues.”28
In 1990, the Congressional Black Caucus met with EPA
to discuss disproportionate environmental risks to Black
communities, and the federal government took its first steps
to address the issues: creating the Environmental Equity
Working Group and two years later establishing the Office
of Environmental Equity.29 Also of pivotal importance was
the first National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held in Washington, D.C., in October 1991
and attended by more than 1,000 delegates from around
the world.30 At this summit, the delegates drafted and
adopted 17 “Principles of Environmental Justice,” which
embody a comprehensive notion of EJ and which continue
to serve as a defining document for the movement.31
Though Congress rejected federal EJ legislation in the
early 1990s,32 the movement was finally recognized in
federal policy in 1995 when President Bill Clinton signed
Executive Order No. 12898, directing federal agencies
to consider EJ issues in decisionmaking.33 The Executive
Order requires each agency to “make achieving environmental justice part of its mission,” and to “develop
an agency-wide environmental justice strategy.”34 It also
ordered the creation of the EJ IWG to help guide and coordinate governmentwide EJ efforts.35
Given the diverse roots of EJ and the different goals
it encompasses, federal recognition has struggled to fully
capture the complexity of the movement. The term “environmental justice” was not explicitly defined in President Clinton’s Executive Order itself, but the problem
was described therein as “the disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects . . .
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 27-28.
U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
Id.
Renamed the Office of Environmental Justice (OEJ) in 1994. Id.
Bullard, supra note 15, at 5.
Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 15.
See, e.g., Environmental Justice Act, H.R. 2105, 103d Cong. (1993). Notably, federal EJ legislation has been proposed and rejected every year since
1992. Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10389.
33. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 394 (citing Exec. Order No. 12898, supra
note 13).
34. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 13, at §§1-101, 1-103.
35. Id. at §1-102.
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on minority populations and low-income populations.”36
Notable here is the focus primarily on the distributive
aspects of EJ as well as the addition of “low-income populations” to the definition of those affected, which broadened the focus beyond race.37 Also notable was President
Clinton’s embrace of the term “environmental justice,”
replacing the term used by EPA at the time, “environmental equity,” and avoiding use of the potentially more controversial term, “environmental racism.”38
In the time since, the government has further broadened
its definition of “environmental justice” to include impacts
on “all people,” rather than focusing on the impacts on
poor and minority populations, and to consider not only
the disproportionate distribution of environmental burdens, but also unequal representation in environmental
decisionmaking processes.39 As such, EPA now defines
“environmental justice” in the following way:
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income,
with respect to the development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and
policies. This goal will be achieved when everyone enjoys:
the same degree of protection from environmental and
health hazards, and equal access to the decision-making
process to have a healthy environment in which to live,
learn, and work.40

Under President Bush, EPA’s approach to EJ has been
described as embodying this more race-neutral definition,
consistently “de-emphasizing minority and low-income
populations and emphasizing the concept of environmental justice for everyone.”41 According to a 2004 report from
the Office of Inspector General (OIG), “[t]he interpretation
that environmental justice is for everyone, while consistent
with the Agency’s overall mission, moved the Agency’s
environmental justice focus away from minority and lowincome populations,” even though “the Executive Order
was issued in an attempt to draw more attention to this
specific part of the population.”42 While EPA agreed that
the intent of the Executive Order “is to address environmental justice concerns in minority and/or low-income
populations,” the Agency also “assert[ed] its firm belief that

36. Id. at §§1-101, 1-102(b), 1-103(a), 3-302(a).
37. Villa, supra note 16, at 4.
38. Id. at 13-14 (suggesting several reasons for the shift away from use of the
term “environmental racism” despite the fact that clearly “race still matters”
today); Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10682 (explaining the disagreement over
whether the term “environmental racism” requires intentional conduct or
also embraces disproportionate impacts and the “desire to encompass class
concerns” as well as race).
39. U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Villa, supra note 16, at 23 (citing Office of Inspector General, U.S.
EPA, Report No. 2004-P-00007, EPA Needs to Consistently Implement the Intent of the Executive Order on Environmental Justice
10 (2004) [hereinafter OIG 2004] (citing Memorandum from Christine
Todd Whitman, Administrator, U.S. EPA, to Assistant Administrators
et al., U.S. EPA, EPA’s Commitment to Environmental Justice (Aug. 9,
2001))).
42. OIG 2004, supra note 41, at 10-11.
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‘environmental justice belongs to all people.’”43 Notably,
although the Obama Administration has generally been
credited for refocusing efforts on EJ, EPA’s definition has
retained not only the dual focus on meaningful involvement and fair distribution of environmental risks and benefits, but also the “all people” language.44

B.

Kuehn’s Taxonomy of EJ

In order then to evaluate progress toward EJ, we must first
define what we mean by “justice.” Numerous EJ activists
and scholars have sought to identify the interconnected
conceptions of justice “embodied in the concept of environmental justice,” and there is no shortage of frameworks
to choose from.45 This Article adopts Kuehn’s four-part
taxonomy of EJ, which builds on the work of philosophers
and scholars before him to create the most comprehensive
framework, identifying four traditional notions of justice
implicated by EJ claims: distributive, procedural, corrective, and social justice.46
“Distributive justice” is the element of justice most
commonly considered in the EJ context,47 and can be
defined as “‘the right to equal treatment, that is, to the
same distribution of goods and opportunities as anyone
else has or is given.’”48 Kuehn describes this notion of justice as focused on a fair distribution of outcomes, not necessarily a fair process.49
The EJ movement, however, has always been about more
than just fair outcomes.50 Like some other EJ frameworks,51
Kuehn’s taxonomy accounts for the broad range of goals
sought by the movement52 by requiring not only fair outcomes (distributive justice), but also fairness in decisionmaking—what Kuehn calls procedural justice53—and a
43. Villa, supra note 16, at 24 (quoting U.S. EPA, Agency Statement on the
Inspector General’s Report on EPA’s Environmental Justice Implementation 1 (2004)).
44. Id. at 28.
45. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10682; see also Bullard, supra note 15, at 6 (distilling equity into three broad categories: procedural, geographic, and social); Kaswan, supra note 14, at 223 (distinguishing between “the two forms
of justice raised by the movement: (1) justice in the existing distribution of
environmental benefits and burdens (‘distributional justice’), and (2) justice
in the decisionmaking processes that determine the distribution of environmental benefits and burdens (‘political justice’)”); Schlosberg, supra note 15,
at 528 (identifying three “intricately linked” elements of justice: distribution, participation, and recognition).
46. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10681.
47. Id. at 10683 (“Of the four aspects of justice implicated by the use of the
term environmental justice, distributive justice concerns have received
the most attention from government officials, scholars, and communities.”); Schlosberg, supra note 15, at 517-18 (describing the majority of
existing EJ frameworks as incomplete for their exclusive emphasis on distributive justice).
48. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10683 (quoting Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously 273 (1977)).
49. Id. at 10684.
50. See supra note 15.
51. See supra note 45 (describing other prominent frameworks).
52. These goals are best encapsulated by the 17 Principles of Environmental
Justice developed during the first National People of Color Environmental
Leadership Summit. See supra note 15.
53. “Procedural justice has been defined as ‘the right to treatment as an equal.
That is the right, not to an equal distribution of some good or opportunity,
but to equal concern and respect in the political decision about how these
goods and opportunities are to be distributed.’” Kuehn, supra note 10, at
10688 (quoting Dworkin, supra note 48).
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recognition of the underlying systemic issues driving inequity—what Kuehn refers to as social justice.54 Where Kuehn’s taxonomy differs from other prominent frameworks is
that it also accounts for a fourth conception of justice: corrective justice, which can be likened to “retributive justice,”
“compensatory justice,” “restorative justice,” and “commutative justice.”55 “Corrective justice,” also embodied in the
17 Principles of Environmental Justice,56 focuses not just
on equal treatment moving forward, but also on the “duty
to repair the losses for which one is responsible.”57
Like other prominent EJ frameworks,58 Kuehn views
these elements of justice as inherently interconnected and
asserts that all four must be addressed to truly achieve
EJ.59 So while distributive justice requires fair distribution
of environmental risks and resources, procedural justice
requires involving affected communities in processes that
are designed to be fair, social justice requires recognizing the broader social context in which these issues arise
and positioning EJ as part of larger racial and economic
struggles, and corrective justice requires also redressing
past harms.
This maximal view of justice may be seen as setting a
remarkably high bar, however, and this Article does not
posit that anything short of success on all three fronts is a
failure. Instead, these notions of justice stand roughly for
the multifaceted goals of the EJ movement, and are used as
a framework for evaluating progress across administrations.

II.

Measuring Progress Across
Administrations

Even once settling upon Kuehn’s framework for understanding EJ, measuring governmental progress toward
the goals of distributive, procedural, social, and corrective
justice remains challenging for at least two reasons: a lack
of specific performance metrics, and shifting priorities
and reporting over time. Given the apparent decreased
importance placed on EJ during the Bush Administration, it comes as little surprise that EJ reporting is hard
to come by prior to the Obama Administration. A 2004
report from the OIG criticized the Bush EPA for its lack
of EJ integration and reporting, noting that “[a]lthough
the Agency ha[d] been actively involved in implementing
Executive Order 12,898 for 10 years, it ha[d] not devel54. “A social justice perspective presents environmental justice as part of
larger problems of racial, social, and economic justice.” Id. at 10699 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 10693-94 (citations omitted).
56. Principles of Environmental Justice, supra note 15 (including the demand
“that all past and current producers be held strictly accountable to the people for detoxification and the containment at the point of production”; and
protection of “the right of victims of environmental injustice to receive full
compensation and reparations for damages as well as quality health care”).
57. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10693 (citing Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of
Corrective Justice, 27 Ariz. L. Rev. 15, 30 (1995)).
58. See, e.g., Schlosberg, supra note 15, at 521 (“Justice demands a focus on
recognition, distribution, and participation. They are three interlinking,
overlapping circles of concern.”); Bullard, supra note 15, at 7 (“The environmental justice framework rests on developing tools, strategies and policies to eliminate the myriad types of unfair, unjust and inequitable conditions and policies.”).
59. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10703.
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oped a clear vision or a comprehensive strategic plan, and
ha[d] not established values, goals, expectations, and performance measurements.”60
Even once the Obama Administration brought a
renewed focus to EJ, EPA was still criticized for not “developing and using performance measures to track agency
progress on its EJ goals.”61 In a 2011 report to Congress,
GAO concluded the following:
EPA’s renewed commitment to environmental justice has
led to a number of actions, including revitalizing stakeholders’ involvement and developing agencywide implementation plans. . . . [But w]ithout performance measures
that align with EPA’s Plan EJ 2014 goals, the agency will
lack the information it needs . . . to effectively assess how
the agency is performing relative to its environmental justice goals and the effect of its overall environmental justice
efforts on intended communities.62

Eight years later, when GAO again evaluated federal EJ
strategies, it found similar problems with measurement.63
EPA had largely implemented its recommendations from
2011, including the recommendation to “include milestones and measures for implementation in its 2020 environmental justice action agenda.”64 Of the 15 other agencies
involved in the EJ IWG, however, only three agencies—
the U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), and U.S. Department of Agriculture—established performance measures
or milestones for their EJ efforts.65 Of these three agencies,
only one—HHS—reported on its progress toward achieving the performance measures or milestones established.66
Additionally, although 14 of the signatory agencies initially developed EJ strategic plans in 2011, as required by
the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed by the
agencies, and “all have issued at least one annual progress
report on the implementation of these plans, . . . most have
not issued such reports every year, as they agreed to do in
the 2011 MOU.”67 As a result, many agencies can identify
specific accomplishments they have made in promoting EJ
but are unable to determine how much progress they have
made overall.68
Even within EPA itself, which did lay out milestones
and performance measurements in its EJ 2020 Action
Agenda, the focus and format of progress reports has
changed between administrations, making it more difficult to draw clear comparisons between the Obama and
60. OIG 2004, supra note 41, at i.
61. GAO, GAO-12-77, Environmental Justice: EPA Needs to Take Additional Actions to Help Ensure Effective Implementation 19-31
(2011).
62. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).
63. GAO, GAO-19-543, Environmental Justice: Federal Efforts Need
Better Planning, Coordination, and Methods to Assess Progress
(2019).
64. Id. at 3-4.
65. Id. at 22.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. at 31.
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Trump Administrations’ efforts.69 Given this lack of clearly
reported metrics, this Article proposes and evaluates three
alternative metrics for progress: (1) the availability of legal
recourse for environmental injustice; (2) consideration of
climate change as an EJ issue; and (3) actions that serve as
signaling functions, such as proposed funding and consideration of EJ in rulemakings. In addition to being measurable, these specific metrics were chosen because they reflect
the diversity of the movement’s goals and allow us to examine progress, or reversal thereof, across all four dimensions
of justice identified by Kuehn.

A.

Availability of Legal Recourse

While legal action may not always be an appropriate
response to EJ “struggles[, which] are at heart political and
economic, not legal,”70 it is one important way to correct
past injustices and to prevent further distributional injustice. Understanding whether and how the availability of
legal recourse has shifted from administration to administration then can provide some insight into the progress
made toward correctional and distributional EJ.
EJ litigation to date has generally been founded on one
of three grounds: traditional environmental laws, equal
protection, or civil rights laws such as Title VI.71 Unfortunately, all three types of claims have been largely unsuccessful, leaving communities without a promising basis for
bringing an EJ claim in federal court.72 As a result, Title VI
administrative claims may offer the best current hope for
legal recourse for EJ claims and are used here as a comparative metric across administrations.

1.	

Limited Availability of Recourse Through
Federal Courts

In some cases, traditional environmental laws have proven
successful in addressing environmental harm generally,
but “[i]n the decades since [their enactment], it became
clear that [they] have a critical flaw—they fail to address
the ways that environmental harms disproportionately
affect low-income people, especially low-income people of
color.”73 The major environmental statutes “do not address
the prospect that their benefits and burdens might turn out
to be unequally distributed in ways that add to cumulative
disadvantage[, and t]hey do not provide measures to avert
disparate impact.”74 While these failures may or may not
be the result of ignorance of distributional concerns,75 they
functionally prevent affected communities from bringing
69. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, Annual Environmental Justice Progress Reports, https://
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/annual-environmental-justice-progressreports (last updated Feb. 19, 2020) (comparing progress reports from fiscal
years (FYs) 2015, 2017, and 2019); see also Engelman Lado, supra note 7, at
302 (noting EPA’s “short-lived” initiative to maintain a web-based docket of
all Title VI cases).
70. Cole, supra note 16, at 524.
71. Grad, supra note 22, §9.10(4)(b)(i).
72. Id.
73. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 394.
74. Jedediah Purdy, The Long Environmental Justice Movement, 44 Ecology
L.Q. 809, 825 (2018).
75. Id. at 835 (noting the debate about whether such omissions were intentional).
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actionable disparate impact claims on the basis of traditional environmental law violations. Some scholars have
even argued that these laws have unintentionally made
things worse for affected communities, by excluding the
average citizen from decisionmaking through the “creat[ion
of] complex administrative processes that exclude most
people who do not have training in the field and necessitate
specific technical expertise.”76
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has historically provided another legal hook for EJ
claims, but they too have been unsuccessful.77 This widespread failure is due largely to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
1976 holding in Washington v. Davis78 that a showing of
discriminatory impact alone is not enough to prove an
equal rights violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.79
Instead, the Court held that “the invidious quality of a
law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.”80 “This is
not to say that the necessary discriminatory racial purpose
must be express or appear on the face of the statute, or that
a law’s disproportionate impact is irrelevant in cases involving Constitution-based claims of racial discrimination.”81
Invidious discrimination may, in some cases, be inferred
from disproportionate impact, particularly in circumstances when “the discrimination is very difficult to explain
on nonracial grounds,”82 “but [disproportionate impact] is
not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination
forbidden by the Constitution.”83 As described above, most
EJ studies have focused on the correlation between environmental harms and race or class, both illustrating and
resulting in difficulty proving intentional discrimination.84
Another approach,
Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, particularly Title VI, has been the other primary vehicle environmental justice advocates have attempted to use to fight
environmental racism. Challenging environmental racial
discrimination through use of Section 1983 has been
largely unsuccessful, however, for the same reasons discussed above with respect to equal protection.85

The provision most often cited in this context, §601 of
Title VI, provides that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”86 Problematically
76.
77.
78.
79.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Cole & Foster, supra note 24, at 30.
Cole, supra note 16, at 538 n.73 (collecting cases as of 1994).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Id. at 239 (“[O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 242.
See supra Section I.A.
Grad, supra note 22, §9.10(4)(B)(iii).
42 U.S.C. §2000d.
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for those wishing to bring a disproportionate impact claim,
the Supreme Court has also long interpreted this provision
to prohibit only intentional discrimination.87
Advocates once hoped that successful claims might
instead be brought under §602, which authorizes federal agencies “to effectuate the provisions of section 601
. . . by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability.”88 “While litigants under Title VI itself
must prove that a defendant intentionally discriminated,
the regulations implementing Title VI across the federal
government generally state that discriminatory effect
(or disparate impact) alone is enough to show unlawful discrimination.”89 These hopes, however, were largely
quashed by the Supreme Court’s 2001 holding in Alexander v. Sandoval.90
There, the Court addressed the question of “whether
private individuals may sue to enforce disparate-impact
regulations promulgated under [§602 of] Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.”91 Finding that Title VI did not
“display an intent to create a freestanding private right of
action to enforce regulations promulgated under §602,” the
Court held that “no such right of action exists.”92 Thus, at
this point in time,93 a successful individual right-of-action
must be filed under §601 and would require the same difficult showing of intentional discrimination as required
under the Equal Protection Clause.

2.	

Title VI Administrative Claims as a
Potential Pathway

Unlike a Title VI claim brought in federal court, Title VI
administrative claims filed with the federal funding agency
may include claims of discriminatory effect.94 Under Title
VI, federal agencies have the authority to conduct periodic
compliance reviews of funding recipients and the duty to
enforce regulations promulgated under §602.95 EPA’s regulations, enacted in 1973, specifically prohibit EPA-funded
agencies “from taking acts, including permitting actions,
that are intentionally discriminatory or have a discriminatory effect based on race, color, or national origin.”96
Within EPA, the External Civil Rights Compliance
Office (ECRCO, previously the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR)) is charged with the Agency’s administration of
Title VI, including with conducting prompt investiga87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
42 U.S.C. §2000d-1.
Cole, supra note 16, at 531.
532 U.S. 275, 278 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 293.
Lawmakers continue to propose legislation that would allow for claims
based on discriminatory impact, including most recently the Environmental
Justice Act of 2017, S. 1996, 115th Cong. §10 (2017) (proposing to amend
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to create a private right-of-action to bring a
claim under §602).
94. OEJ, U.S. EPA, Title VI and Executive Order 12898 Comparison
(2014), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/
title-vi-ej-comparison.pdf.
95. Id.
96. U.S. EPA, Title VI Laws and Regulations (emphasis added), https://www.
epa.gov/ocr/title-vi-laws-and-regulations (last updated Oct. 30, 2019).
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tions of alleged Title VI violations.97 Complaints must
be filed in writing, and describe the allegedly discriminatory acts within 180 days of the acts, unless the ECRCO
waives the time limit for good cause.98 The ECRCO will
alert the complainant and recipient of receipt of the complaint within five calendar days and immediately initiate
complaint processing procedures.99 Within 20 calendar
days of acknowledgment of the complaint, the ECRCO
will complete its preliminary investigation and determine
whether to accept, reject, or refer the complaint to another
appropriate federal agency.100 If the ECRCO accepts the
complaint, the office will notify the “applicant or recipient
complained against of the allegations and give the applicant or recipient opportunity to make a written submission
responding to, rebutting, or denying the allegations raised
in the complaint.”101
Within 180 days of the start of the complaint investigation, the ECRCO will then complete preliminary findings
and recommendations for voluntary compliance, which
the recipient may then choose to comply with or challenge.102 Alternatively, if the office’s preliminary investigation reveals no violation, it will dismiss the complaint and
notify the parties.103 Whenever possible, “[the ECRCO]
shall attempt to resolve complaints informally,”104 but if
compliance with this part cannot be assured by informal
means, EPA has a number of other tools at its disposal,
including the authority to “terminate or refuse to award or
to continue assistance [or] . . . any other means authorized
by law to get compliance, including a referral of the matter
to the Department of Justice.”105 In measuring availability
of recourse under Title VI claims, this Article considers
the Agency’s record in accepting cases for investigation and
issuing findings of discrimination across administrations.
❑   Bush era. Historically, EPA’s adjudication of alleged
Title VI violations is widely believed to have been inadequate.106 An independent review of the OCR conducted
in 2011 revealed that while EPA’s regulations clearly allow
the Agency 20 days to decide whether to investigate a formal complaint under the federal rules, and another 180
days to complete an investigation and issue possible findings of civil rights violations, only 6% of the 247 Title VI
complaints received between 1993 and October 2010 were
accepted or dismissed within the 20-day time limit.107
In fact, EPA took more than one year to accept or
dismiss half of these complaints.108 One complaint was
97. 40 C.F.R. §7.120 (2020).
98. Id. §7.120(b).
99. Id. §7.120(c)-(d).
100. Id. §7.120(d)(1)(i).
101. Id. §7.120(d)(1)(ii).
102. Id. §7.115(c)-(d).
103. Id. §7.120(g).
104. Id. §7.120(d)(2)(i).
105. Id. §7.130(a).
106. See, e.g., Deloitte Consulting LLP, Evaluation of the EPA Office of
Civil Rights Final Report 1 (2011).
107. This report was commissioned by EPA during President Obama’s first
term and reflects findings from the terms of Presidents Clinton, Bush, and
Obama (first two years). It is used here to exemplify the Office’s long track
record of inadequate response. Id. at 19.
108. Id. at 25.
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accepted a full nine years after being received, and another
was accepted after 10 years.109 Among the reasons suggested
for this poor performance, the report observed that EPA
did not provide Title VI compliance guidance to funding
recipients, and the OCR had no tracking system to monitor investigations and complaints.110
❑   Obama era. Despite the continued poor track record
during the first few years of Obama’s presidency, the Administration is credited for acknowledging the Agency’s
failures in resolving Title VI claims and making some improvements to the system of enforcing and ensuring compliance after commissioning the independent review discussed above.111 Such improvements included developing
a case resolution manual to provide procedural guidance
to “ensure EPA’s prompt, effective, and efficient resolution of civil rights cases”; releasing the External Compliance and Complaints Program Strategic Plan for fiscal
years (FYs) 2015-2020; identifying 23 deputy civil rights
officials across the Agency to “support the civil rights mission and ensure its success throughout EPA”; and moving enforcement of Title VI claims from the OCR to the
ECRCO, which is located in EPA’s Office of General
Counsel.112 EPA under Obama was also recognized for
beginning to clean up the substantial backlog of Title VI
cases and for making the first ever findings of discrimination in the Title VI context, both made on the last day of
the Obama Administration.113
At the same time, a 2016 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR) still criticized EPA as
unsuccessful “in utilizing its Title VI authority to ensure
that states and other entities that receive EPA financial
assistance comply with EPA’s Title VI nondiscrimination
mandates.”114 According to data the ECRCO shared with
USCCR, the office received a decreasing number of new
complaints from 2016-2018: 31 in FY 2016, 25 in FY 2017,
and 15 in FY 2018.115 During FY 2016, which was entirely
within the Obama Administration, the office accepted
eight complaints for investigation and rejected three.116 By
contrast, during FY 2017, which included roughly the final
quarter of the Obama Administration and the first nine
months of the Trump Administration, the office accepted
10 complaints for investigation and rejected 23.117
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), Environmental Justice:
Examining the Environmental Protection Agency’s Compliance and
Enforcement of Title VI and Executive Order 12,898, at 50 (2016)
[hereinafter USCCR 2016]. But see Engelman Lado, supra note 7, at 301-06
(describing steps taken under the Obama Administration as “an incremental
approach to reform” and also as “too little, too late”).
112. USCCR 2016, supra note 111, at 49-50.
113. Engelman Lado, supra note 7, at 303-04; USCCR, Are Rights a Reality? Evaluating Federal Civil Rights Enforcement 399-400 (2019)
[hereinafter USCCR 2019].
114. USCCR 2016, supra note 111, at 22.
115. USCCR 2019, supra note 113, at 394-95.
116. Id. at 395. The federal government FY runs from October through September, such that FY 2016 ran from October 2015 through September 2016,
FY 2017 ran from October 2016 through September 2017, and FY 2018
ran from October 2017 through September 2018.
117. Id.
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❑   Trump era. This apparent trend toward rejecting an increasing percentage of complaints continued in FY 2018,
when the office accepted just two complaints for investigation and rejected 31.118 These numbers are an admittedly
small sample, representing roughly one-and-one-half years
of the Trump Administration, but updated case resolution
info is not readily available through EPA’s website, and
this data alone shows a marked decrease in the percentage
of complaints accepted for investigation: from eight to 10
to two; and a marked increase in the percentage of complaints rejected: from three to 23 to 31.119 Together, these
numbers could be interpreted as a notable decrease in access to legal recourse through the Title VI administrative
claims process.
❑   Comparison. The major progress in resolving Title VI
claims between the Bush and Obama Administrations is
largely seen not in the number of claims resolved, but in
the Agency’s recognition of its long-standing failings and
its attempts—through training, guidance, and reorganization—to improve the process. The first ever findings of
discrimination were also seen at the time as “represent[ing]
an uptick in activity by a civil-rights office . . . long criticized for failing to act on complaints alleging Title VI
violations.”120 These findings, however, were both made on
the last day of the Administration.121
Can two actions taken on the very last day really be said
to represent much in the way of progress? This “uptick”
in findings and in general emphasis on claim resolution
does not seem to have continued into the Trump Administration. If anything, the decreasing number of claims
accepted and increasing number of claims rejected may be
said to signal a reversal of course. But with so few resulting formal findings of discrimination, does it really make
a difference whether complaints are accepted or rejected in
the first instance?
❑    Applying Kuehn’s taxonomy. The answer to these questions may depend in part upon the notion of justice considered here. Kuehn himself described Title VI claims
of disproportionate impact as reflecting distributional
justice concerns, as they seek to remedy the “‘disproportionate burden’ or ‘disparate impact’” on a racial class.122
It could be argued that solely accepting a larger number
of claims (as under the Obama Administration) did not
constitute much of a gain in the way of distributional
justice outcomes when just two formal findings of discrimination were made. It would follow then that not
much was lost in terms of distributional justice when a
smaller number were accepted under President Trump.
118. Id.
119. Id. Complaints accepted and rejected were not necessarily initiated in the
same FY, so these numbers cannot accurately be expressed as a percentage of
the overall claims filed in a given year.
120. Id. (citing Talia Buford, Rare Discrimination Finding by EPA Civil Rights
Office, Center for Pub. Integrity, Jan. 25, 2017, https://publicintegrity.
org/environment/rare-discrimination-finding-by-epa-civil-rights-office/).
121. Id. at 399-400. The findings were also criticized by some advocates for the
Agency’s “failure to require effective remedies.” Engelman Lado, supra note
7, at 303.
122. Kuehn, supra note 10, at 10684.
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Alternatively, we could extrapolate from the greater action (more investigations and actual formal findings of
discrimination) taken under President Obama that some
greater substantive outcome would have resulted, had the
progress continued, so some degree of distributional justice, and perhaps even the possibility for corrective justice,
was foregone as a result of the change in administrations.
From a procedural justice perspective, there may also
be more to be said for the benefit of fully investigating a
larger percentage of claims in that it may indicate greater
consideration and involvement in decisionmaking: fairer
treatment and respect under the law. From a social justice
perspective, the issuance of the first two formal findings of
discrimination, even if largely symbolic, could be seen as
an important validation of the broader social, racial, and
economic justice struggles inherent in EJ. So too could the
recognition that the Agency was failing in its duties and
the steps taken to improve the process. Symbols matter
from a social justice perspective and may therefore represent important steps toward justice in and of themselves.

B.

Consideration of Climate Change as an
EJ Issue

Climate change is the existential environmental threat of
our lifetimes, “transforming where and how we live and
present[ing] growing challenges to human health and
quality of life, the economy, and the natural systems that
support us.”123 Because the impacts are expected to, and
in fact already do, hit lower-income communities and
communities of color hardest,124 climate change is also
inescapably an issue of EJ. There is no longer a question
that increased temperatures are leading to rising sea levels,
increased extreme weather events, and resulting disruption
and damage to critical infrastructure, ecosystem services,
air and water quality, agricultural productivity, and the
overall vitality of our communities.125
No less real is the well-established fact that the “[i]mpacts
within and across regions will not be distributed equally.
People who are already vulnerable, including lower-income
and otherwise marginalized communities, have less capacity to prepare for and cope with extreme weather and climate-related events and are expected to experience greater
impacts.”126 Poor communities have also tended to contrib123. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Fourth National Climate
Assessment, Volume II Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United
States: Report-in-Brief 26 (2018) [hereinafter Fourth National Climate Assessment], https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_
Report-in-Brief.pdf.
124. See infra note 126.
125. Fourth National Climate Assessment, supra note 123, at 12-19.
126. Id. at 12. See also Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for
Greenhouse Gases Under Section 20(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg.
66496, 66498 (Dec. 15, 2009) (noting that “the Administrator places
weight on the fact that certain groups, including children, the elderly, and
the poor are most vulnerable to . . . climate-related health effects”); Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral
Aspects (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WGIIAR5-PartA_FINAL.pdf (finding that “[c]limate-related hazards exacerbate other stressors,
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ute least to and benefit least from the industrial “progress”
that has driven human-centered global warming, resulting
in what some have called an “ecological debt.”127
In this line of thinking, the disproportionate use of
natural resources by wealthier communities to the disproportionate detriment of poorer communities and
communities of color128 requires a corrective scheme of differentiated responsibility, in which “the countries which
have benefitted from a high degree of industrialization, at
the cost of enormous emissions of greenhouse gases, have a
greater responsibility providing a solution to the problems
they have caused.”129 For these reasons, an administration’s
response to climate change, including the degree to which
it embraces the idea of differentiated responsibility, may be
used as another barometer of progress toward EJ.

1.	

Bush Era

President Bush’s “financial interests in the oil industry
and his weak environmental record as governor of Texas
did not inspire optimism” about his approach to climate
change, so environmental advocates were pleasantly surprised when his EPA Administrator, Christine Todd Whitman, “began to stake out a resolute position on climate
change” early in his Administration.130 However, shortly
after a “now infamous speech at a G-8 conference of environment ministers,” in which Whitman “proclaimed that
the Bush administration would support an internationally
coordinated response to climate change,”131 Bush reversed
course and formally withdrew the United States from the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which “outlined legally binding
emissions reductions for developed countries to specified
amounts below 1990 levels.”132 In so doing, Bush cited
“incompatab[ility] with domestic energy production goals”
and the economic harm that the United States would suffer because of a lack of mandatory reduction targets for
developing countries,133 thus directly rejecting the notion
of differentiated responsibility for climate change.
On April 19, 2001, leaders of the EJ movement from
around the world sent a letter to President Bush, expressing their “profound concern with [Bush’s] new climate
change policies with respect to their impacts on poor people and people of color in the United States and around the
often with negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living
in poverty”); Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for Our Common
Home 20 (2015) (asserting that the poor will feel the impacts of climate
change most in part because “[t]hey have no other financial activities or resources which can enable them to adapt to climate change or to face natural
disasters, and their access to social services and protection is very limited”).
127. Pope Francis, supra note 126, at 36-37.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 34 (quoting Bolivian Bishops’ Conference, Pastoral Letter on the Environment and Human Development in Bolivia El Universo, Don de Dios
Para la Vida 86 (Mar. 23, 2012)).
130. Cohen, supra note 7, at 70-71.
131. Id. at 72.
132. Congressional Research Service, RL31931, Climate Change: Federal Laws and Policies Related to Greenhouse Gas Reductions 4
(2008).
133. Cohen, supra note 7, at 71-72.
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world.”134 In it, they accused Bush of siding with oil companies over the poor, allowing poor communities to “face
a ‘double whammy’—suffering oil’s acute toxic impacts
first and then its long-term effects in the form of the harsh
hand of global warming”; and described the Administration’s “failure to follow through on campaign promises to
reduce carbon dioxide emissions and [the] abandonment
of the Kyoto Protocol” as “border[ing] on nothing short of
gross global negligence.”135
The leaders urged President Bush to “reconsider [his]
position on climate change,” and “severely curb U.S.
carbon emissions and support the Kyoto Protocol.”136
Instead, Bush, like his father and President Clinton before
him, “largely relied on voluntary initiatives to reduce
the growth of greenhouse gas emissions”137 and continued to reject mandatory reduction targets throughout his
presidency.138 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions continued to rise, the effects of climate change intensified, and
the federal government continued not to recognize that
the impact would disproportionately be felt by poor and
minority communities.

2.	

Obama Era

The bulk of President Obama’s efforts to fight climate
change were realized during his second term, at which
point the president also openly embraced the United
States’ global responsibility for reducing GHG emissions
by signing on to the Paris Agreement.139 On November
1, 2013, President Obama issued Executive Order No.
13653, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, in which the president explicitly recognized
that the “impacts [of climate change] are often most significant for communities that already face economic or
health-related challenges,” and the need for “deliberate
preparation, close cooperation, and coordinated planning
by the Federal Government, as well as by stakeholders” to
mitigate such effects and increase the resilience of vulnerable communities.140
President Obama’s Climate Action Plan put forward a
“broad-based plan to cut the carbon pollution that causes
climate change and affects public health” and to “prepare
the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change.”141
The promulgation of the final Clean Power Plan (CPP) rule
was one “important step in [this] essential series of longterm actions . . . to achieve the GHG emission reductions
134. Letter from Global EJ Leaders to President George W. Bush (Apr. 19,
2001), https://corpwatch.org/article/environmental-justice-appeal-bushclimate-change.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Congressional Research Service, supra note 132, at summary page.
138. See, e.g., id. at 9 (noting that the United States described reduction goals
discussed at the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate
Change in September 2007 as “aspirational” rather than binding).
139. Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris Agreement, White House, Sept. 3, 2016, https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/09/03/president-obama-united-statesformally-enters-paris-agreement.
140. Exec. Order No. 13653, 3 C.F.R. 330 (2013) (since repealed).
141. Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action
Plan 5 (2013) [hereinafter Climate Action Plan].
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needed to address the serious threat of climate change.”142
Citing reports from EPA and the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, the CPP rule identified “CO2 [carbon dioxide] [as] the primary GHG pollutant, accounting
for nearly three-quarters of global GHG emissions and
82% of U.S. GHG emissions,” highlighting “the urgency
of addressing the rising concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere.”143 The CPP specifically targeted reductions
in CO2 emissions from electric generating units (power
plants),144 while other directives and regulations focused
on increasing fuel economy standards, providing incentives for continued growth in the renewable energy sector,
cutting energy waste, reducing other GHGs, and leading
international efforts to address global climate change.145
The CPP rule itself presented climate change as a
clear EJ issue, and articulated goals to particularly benefit EJ communities:
Low-income communities and communities of color
already overburdened by pollution are disproportionately
affected by climate change and are less resilient than others to adapt to or recover from climate-change impacts.
While this rule will provide broad benefits to communities across the nation by reducing GHG emissions, it will
be particularly beneficial to populations that are disproportionately vulnerable to the impacts of climate change
and air pollution.146

The CPP also explicitly directed states to consider impacts
on vulnerable communities, required that states document
their engagement with these communities, and encouraged
states to consider how best “to help low-income communities share in the investments in infrastructure, job creation,
and other benefits that [renewable energy] and demandside [energy-efficiency] programs provide, have access to
financial assistance programs, and minimize any adverse
impacts that their plans could have on communities.”147
Rules such as the CPP then were not only intended to
achieve distributional justice by reducing the disproportionate burdens on poor and minority communities, but
also to achieve procedural justice by involving these communities in decisionmaking processes.

3.	

Trump Era

From his time on the campaign trail, however, President
Trump made rolling back regulations a priority, “explicitly
and implicitly revers[ing] course on environmental policies
to the detriment of low-income communities of color,” in
part through a retreat from climate mitigation and adaptation strategies.148 Since taking office, the Trump Adminis142. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662, 64677 (Oct. 23,
2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60 and since repealed).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See generally Climate Action Plan, supra note 141.
146. 80 Fed. Reg. at 64670.
147. Id.
148. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 396-97.
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tration has proposed or completed rollbacks of nearly 100
environmental rules, many of which were implemented
with direct or indirect goals of reducing GHG emissions and slowing the speed of climate change.149 President Trump further retreated from climate protection by
announcing his intention to withdraw the United States
from the Paris Climate Accord, which he criticized precisely for its embrace of differentiated responsibility.150
During his first few months in office, President Trump
issued a series of Executive Orders that clearly signaled a
move away from the regulatory protections implemented
during the Obama Administration. In his second week
in office, President Trump issued Executive Order No.
13771, Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, directing “that for every one new regulation
issued, at least two prior regulations be identified for
elimination, and that the cost of planned regulations be
prudently managed and controlled through a budgeting
process.”151 Less than one month later, he issued an Executive Order, Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda,
directing each agency to create a Regulatory Reform Task
Force to “evaluate existing regulations . . . and make recommendations to the agency head regarding their repeal,
replacement, or modification.”152
Soon thereafter, the president issued yet another Executive Order in the same vein, aimed specifically at the
energy industry.153 The Order declared a national interest
in “promot[ing] clean and safe development of our Nation’s
vast energy resources, while at the same time avoiding
regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy
production, constrain economic growth, and prevent job
creation”; and directed the heads of agencies to immediately “review all existing regulations, orders, guidance
documents, policies, and any other similar agency actions
(collectively, agency actions) that potentially burden the
development or use of domestically produced energy
resources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal,
and nuclear energy resources.”154
The Executive Order immediately revoked “Certain
Energy and Climate-Related Presidential and Regulatory
Actions,”155 rescinded President Obama’s Climate Action
Plan and Climate Action Plan Strategy to Reduce Methane
Emissions, directed the Council on Environmental Quality
149. See Nadja Popovich et al., The Trump Administration Is Reversing Nearly
100 Environmental Rules. Here’s the Full List., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/climate/trump-environmentrollbacks.html (listing rollbacks).
150. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-presidenttrump-paris-climate-accord/ (referring to the Accord as “the latest example
of Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United
States to the exclusive benefit of other countries, leaving American workers—who I love—and taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly diminished economic production”).
151. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
152. Exec. Order No. 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Mar. 1, 2017).
153. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. The presidential actions revoked include the following:
(i) Executive Order 13653 of November 1, 2013 (Preparing the
United States for the Impacts of Climate Change);
(ii) The Presidential Memorandum of June 25, 2013 (Power Sector Carbon Pollution Standards);
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(CEQ) to rescind its Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on Consideration of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions and the Effects of Climate Change in National
Environmental Policy Act Reviews,156 disbanded the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Greenhouse
Gases, withdrew the IWG’s technical support documents
on the social cost of carbon for regulatory impact analysis
“as no longer representative of governmental policy” and
redefined the social cost of carbon more narrowly, and
directed EPA to immediately review the CPP and related
rules and Agency actions for possible suspension, reversal,
or repeal.157
On July 8, 2019, EPA subsequently published “three
separate and distinct rulemakings”: (1) repealing the
CPP “because the Agency has determined that the CPP
exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority under the Clean Air
Act (CAA)”; (2) finalizing the Administration’s replacement emission guidelines for existing power plants, the
Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule; and (3) “finalizing
new regulations for the EPA and state implementation
of ACE and any future emission guidelines issued under
CAA section 111(d).”158
President Trump often characterizes government regulation as unnecessary and excessive,159 and the final rule
repealing and replacing the CPP makes just this point,
emphasizing that the new, more limited, ACE guidelines
are sufficient to protect vulnerable communities:
The EPA believes that this action will achieve CO2
emission reductions resulting from implementation of
these final guidelines, as well as ozone and PM 2.5 [fine
particulate matter] emission reductions as a co-benefit,
and will further improve environmental justice communities’ health. . . .

(iii) The Presidential Memorandum of November 3, 2015 (Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources From Development and
Encouraging Related Private Investment); and
(iv) The Presidential Memorandum of September 21, 2016 (Climate Change and National Security).
Id. at 16094.
156. This guidance was not a regulation itself but presented “CEQ’s interpretation of what is appropriate under NEPA [the National Environmental
Policy Act] and the CEQ Regulations for Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of NEPA.” The guidance recommended, inter alia,
that agencies use projected GHG emissions as a proxy for assessing
potential climate change effects when preparing a NEPA analysis
for a proposed agency action; . . . that agencies quantify projected
direct and indirect GHG emissions; . . . [and] counsel[ed] agencies
to use information developed during the NEPA review to consider
alternatives that would make the actions and affected communities
more resilient to the effects of a changing climate.
Consideration of Greenhouse Gas Emissions and the Effects of Climate
Change in National Environmental Policy Act Reviews, 81 Fed. Reg. 51866
(Aug. 5, 2016).
157. Exec. Order No. 13783, supra note 153.
158. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to
Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32520 (July
8, 2019) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60); 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q, ELR
Stat. CAA §§101-618.
159. Council of Economic Advisers, The Growth Potential of Deregulation 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
documents/The%20Growth%20Potential%20of%20Deregulation_1.pdf.
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With regards to the repeal, . . . the EPA believes that
the power sector is already on path to achieve the CO2
reductions required by the CPP, therefore the EPA does
not believe it would have any significant impact on EJ
effected communities.

...
Moreover, this action does not affect the level of public
health and environmental protection already being provided by existing NAAQS [national ambient air quality
standards], including ozone and PM2.5, and other mechanisms in the CAA.160

These words were, in fact, the only reference to EJ throughout the 64-page rule.161
In addition to arguing that the CPP and related climate
policies were unnecessary to achieve emission reductions,
the Administration has at times argued in the alternative
that global warming may not be man-made,162 and that,
even if it were, any emissions reductions made by the
United States would be virtually meaningless when held
up against the vast emissions from growing economies like
China.163 More generally, the Administration argues that
government “[r]egulations serve as an additional tax on the
U.S. economy, often making beneficial economic transactions more expensive or preventing them outright.”164 Thus,
the argument goes, regulations make the United States less
competitive globally, prove especially costly for small businesses and entrepreneurs, and perpetuate inequality by
impacting the most vulnerable the most:
Across households, the burden of government regulation
falls most heavily on low-income Americans, who spend
a larger proportion of their income on heavily regulated
goods including transportation, gasoline, utilities, food,
and heath care. [A] 10 percent increase in total regulations
leads to a 0.687 percent increase in consumer prices, with
the poorest households experiencing the highest overall
levels of inflation and price volatility. Low-income households also experience a disproportionate burden of the
health and safety regulations, a large proportion of which
protect against low-probability events.165

According to the regulatory impact analysis for the
repeal of the CPP and promulgation of the ACE rule,166
however, even when using the modified domestic social
160. 84 Fed. Reg. at 32574.
161. The final rule repealing the CPP and establishing replacement emission
guidelines for power plants used the term “environmental justice” just once
apart from the table of contents. See generally 84 Fed. Reg. 32520.
162. See, e.g., Trump: Climate Change Scientists Have “Political Agenda,” BBC News,
Oct. 15, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45859325.
163. Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord, supra note 150.
164. Council of Economic Advisers, supra note 159.
165. Id. at 6-8 (internal citations omitted).
166. Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Repeal of the Clean Power Plan, and
the Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units (2019) (EPA-452/R-19-003).
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cost of carbon (SC-CO2)167 adopted under President
Trump, which only accounts for direct impacts of climate
change anticipated to occur within the contiguous United
States, “each of the four illustrative scenarios yield [millions of dollars of] forgone climate benefits and [billions
of dollars of] forgone ancillary health co-benefits relative
to . . . the CPP.”168 Other estimates indicate that rollbacks
of just six environmental rules that “provide the largest and
best near-term opportunities to reduce climate pollution”
are estimated to result in foregoing more than 200 million metric tons of GHG reductions.169 It may follow, then,
that “[w]here exposure to environmental harms disproportionately tracks racial and income lines, cutting programs
addressing those harms risks exacerbating them for those
already most burdened.”170

4.	Comparison
From President Bush to President Obama and from President Obama to President Trump, we see a marked change
in the approach to climate change. President Bush refused
to recognize the country’s global responsibility as a leading GHG emitter and refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol;
while President Obama embraced the principle of differentiated responsibility, signed on to the Paris Agreement,
and explicitly recognized the disproportionate impacts of
climate change on poor and minority communities. President Trump, on the other hand, expressly rejects the notion
of differentiated responsibility and sees no reason to correct
the unequal distribution of benefits and burdens. We also
see a difference in the way EJ drives climate policy between
the Obama and Trump Administrations—whereas President Obama’s policies devote significant consideration to
the disparate impacts on EJ communities171 and aim to
specifically raise up EJ communities, President Trump’s
policies pay only lip service to EJ concerns172 and seek to
minimally raise up “all people,” essentially maintaining the
status quo.

167. “The SC-CO2 is a metric that estimates the monetary value of impacts associated with marginal changes in CO2 emissions in each year.” Id. at ES-10.
168. Id. at ES-12 to ES-13. It is notable that the accountings in the regulatory
impact analysis do not even account for adverse health effects associated
with sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide, or other hazardous air pollutants. Id. at
4-47 to 4-51.
169. State Energy and Environmental Impact Law Center, New York
University School of Law, Climate and Health Showdown in the
Courts: State Attorneys General Prepare to Fight 3, 5 (2019).
170. See, e.g., Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 402, arguing that
[a]t a global scale, the Trump Administration’s rejection of climate
science and repudiation of the Paris Agreement represents a conscious refusal to take steps to prevent and—equally important—
protect against climate change impacts. This stance directly harms
low-income communities of color in the United States and around
the globe, which are expected to experience the worst environmental, economic, and health effects of climate change.
171. In the CPP, for example, the term “environmental justice” was mentioned
46 times. See generally 80 Fed. Reg. 64662.
172. See, e.g., the repeal of the CPP rule and implementation of the ACE rule,
supra note 161.
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5.	

Applying Kuehn’s Taxonomy

Assuming for the moment that the CPP and other Obamaera climate policies would have resulted in increased protections for EJ communities, most of these policies (like the
CPP) never actually went into effect and therefore resulted
in no measurable impact. The most that might be said then
in terms of distributional or corrective outcomes between
the Bush and Obama Administrations is that these policies may have eventually resulted in such substantive progress. It follows then that their rollback under the Trump
Administration, like the rejection of an increasing percentage of Title VI claims, can be said to have resulted
in foregone distributional and corrective justice. There are,
however, clearer ramifications for procedural and social
justice at play.
Implementing regulations such as the CPP that carefully incorporated considerations of disproportionate
impacts on particularly vulnerable communities and
involving such communities in decisionmaking, like the
improvements made to the Title VI process, constituted
procedural and social justice progress in and of themselves.
These actions recognized the underlying inequities and
provided for fairer processes. In the same way, replacing
such regulations with rules such as the ACE rule, which
pay little attention to EJ, stripped EJ communities of procedural justice and stripped the environmental impacts of
their broader racial, social, and economic contexts. Add to
this the rejection, embrace, and repeated rejection of differentiated responsibility embodied by the Kyoto Protocol
and the Paris Accord, and from a procedural or social justice perspective, current climate policies may very well be
said to be reversing course on EJ.173

C.

Actions That Serve Signaling Functions

Other actions by the Office of Environmental Justice
(OEJ) and administrations more broadly might best be
described as “signaling” the importance of EJ issues. Such
functions both serve social and procedural justice in and
of themselves by validating the cause and signaling a commitment to addressing the issues, while also potentially
driving future substantive change that might result in distributive and/or corrective justice.174 President Clinton’s
Executive Order on EJ might be seen as one such example,
in that it acknowledged the “disproportionately high and
adverse human health or environmental effects of [gov173. Credit for this term goes to Uma Outka and Elizabeth Kronk Warner, whose
article of this name (cited throughout this Article) considers in-depth how
the Trump Administration has “explicitly and implicitly reversed course on
environmental policies to the detriment of low-income communities of
color,” using transitions at EPA, the Dakota Access Pipeline, and the Paris
Climate Accord to illustrate this point. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at
396-97.
174. “Signaling theory” offers one such explanation for how individual signals
can drive substantive change through the development of norms. See, e.g.,
Kristin Madison, Government, Signaling, and Social Norms, 2001 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 867, 871 (2001) (reviewing Eric Posner’s book, explaining his argument “that social norms are created through the aggregation of the actions
of individuals. . . . As more people send a particular signal, it becomes a
social norm.”).
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ernment] programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations” and directed
federal agencies to develop EJ strategies.175 The Order officially validated community concerns and signaled a desire
to involve affected communities in addressing those concerns, but itself did not actually change the distribution
of benefits and burdens, nor did it create any judicially
enforceable rights.176
The actions that serve signaling functions examined
here across administrations were chosen to reflect how
extensively EJ has (or has not) been incorporated into the
day-to-day operations at EPA and include activity in the
OEJ, involvement in the EJ IWG, proposed funding for
EJ, and consideration of EJ in rulemaking. On the surface,
there are some signals that EJ work has continued much the
same across administrations, while other signals indicate a
more variable commitment from administration to administration, with particular implications for social justice.

1.	

Bush Era

Throughout the Bush Administration, EPA was criticized
by investigators from GAO and the OIG for a “flagging
dedication to environmental justice.”177 The EJ IWG,
established under Executive Order No. 12898 to provide
guidance to federal agencies,178 lay dormant179; and the
president sought to decrease funding for EJ enforcement
in all but two of his proposed budgets between 2002 and
2008, even when Congress twice significantly increased
the budget appropriated for EJ enforcement.180
175. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 13.
176. The Executive Order stated:
This order is intended only to improve the internal management
of the executive branch and is not intended to, nor does it create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the United
States, its agencies, its officers, or any person. This order shall not
be construed to create any right to judicial review involving the
compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its agencies, its
officers, or any other person with this order.
Id. §6-609.
177. Villa, supra note 16, at 27.
178. Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 13, at §1-102.
179. See Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10388 (stating that the Obama Administration reconvened the IWG for the first time in more than a decade,
thus indicating it had not met during the Bush Administration); EJ IWG,
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Justice and Executive
Order 12898, at 2 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter MOU] (indicating a lapse in
activity by describing the MOU’s purposes as “renew[ing] the process under
Executive Order 12898 for agencies to provide environmental justice strategies and implementation progress reports” and “establish[ing] structures
and procedures to ensure that the Interagency Working Group operates effectively and efficiently”).
180. “There is no specific environmental justice statute to fund environmental
justice activities in EPA. Consequently, the Office of Environmental Justice
performs activities using a general Environmental Program Management
appropriation budget line item; in Fiscal Year 2002, this amounted to approximately $4.4 million.” OIG 2004, supra note 41, at 4. For FY 2003, the
president sought to increase funding to $4.98 million. U.S. EPA, Summary
of the 2003 Budget VII-8 (2002) (EPA-205-S-02-001). For FY 2004,
the president sought to reduce the budget to $4.73 million. U.S. EPA,
Summary of the 2004 Budget D-5 (2003) (EPA-205-S-03-001). For FY
2005, he sought to increase the budget from the $5.04 million enacted for
FY 2004 to $5.13 million. U.S. EPA, Summary of EPA’s 2005 Budget
D-5 (2004) (EPA-205-S-04-001). For FY 2006, he sought to reduce it to
$4.82 million from the $5.03 million enacted for FY 2005. U.S. EPA, Summary of EPA’s 2006 Budget D-5 (2005) (EPA-S-05-001). For FY 2007,
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Several independent reports from the time help to further paint the picture. In 2006, the OIG credited EPA with
“integrating environmental justice into its programs, policies, and activities through developing action plans from
each of the program and regional offices,” while also criticizing the Agency for failing to provide any agencywide
guidance on EJ program or policy review and not consistently performing such reviews, despite the clear directive
of Executive Order No. 12898.181 And in a 2005 report to
Congress, GAO highlighted the Bush EPA’s failure to consider EJ in rulemaking, finding that “EPA generally devoted
little attention to environmental justice” in clean air rulemakings between 2000 and 2004.182 “[O]f the 19 clean air
rules finalized during this period that met [GAO’s] criteria,
only 3 even included the terms ‘environmental justice’ or
‘Executive Order 12,898’ in the final rule.”183
Of these three rules, GAO found minimal attention
paid to EJ in all four phases of rule drafting:
[F]irst, initial reports used to flag potential issues for
senior management did not address environmental justice. Second, although EPA guidance suggests that workgroups should consider ways to build in environmental
justice provisions early in the rulemaking process, there
is reason to question whether this occurred for the three
rules . . . Third, although EPA officials told [GAO] that
for the proposed rules, their economic reviews—which
are intended to inform decision makers of the social consequences of the rules—considered environmental justice,
[GAO] found that the reviews for [two of the] rules did
not include environmental justice analyses. Moreover,
EPA has not identified all of the types of data necessary
to perform such an analysis. Finally, in publishing the
proposed rules (an opportunity for EPA to explain how it
considered environmental justice), EPA mentioned environmental justice in all three cases, but the discussion was
contradictory in one case.184

Overall, a rather dismal attempt to comply with Executive
Order No. 12898, and a possible further signal that EPA
was not prioritizing EJ.

he sought to reduce it to $4.62 million from the $6.40 million enacted for
FY 2006. U.S. EPA, Budget 2007 D-4 (2006) (EPA-205-S-06-001). For
FY 2008, he sought to reduce it to $4.58 million from the $4.62 million enacted for FY 2007. U.S. EPA, FY 2008 EPA Budget in Brief D-4 (2007)
(EPA-205-S-07-001). For FY 2009, the format of reporting changed, and
EJ enforcement began to be listed as two separate line items under Environmental Program & Management Enforcement and Hazardous Substance
Superfund Enforcement. For FY 2009, the president proposed reducing
the total EJ budget to $4.57 million from the $7.14 million enacted in
FY 2008. U.S. EPA, FY 2009 EPA Budget in Brief D4 & D6 (2008)
(EPA-205-S-08-001).
181. Villa, supra note 16, at 27-28 (citing OIG, U.S. EPA, 2006-P-00034, EPA
Needs to Conduct Environmental Justice Reviews of Its Programs,
Policies, and Activities 5-7 (2006)).
182. Id. at 27 (citing GAO, GAO-05-289, Environmental Justice: EPA
Should Devote More Attention to Environmental Justice When
Developing Clean Air Rules 3 (2005)).
183. GAO, supra note 182, at 3.
184. Id. at 3-4.
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2.	

Obama Era

By contrast, the Obama Administration has been credited
with integrating EJ into the day-to-day work of EPA and
other federal agencies185 and sending clear signals that EJ
was an important focus for the Administration.186 Such
actions included issuing guidance for incorporating EJ into
rulemaking and encouraging communities to participate
in permitting processes187; reconvening the EJ IWG for
the first time in more than a decade and obtaining a commitment from participating federal agencies to develop
and implement EJ strategies188; developing and releasing EJSCREEN, “an environmental justice mapping and
screening tool”189; and creating comprehensive EJ strategies, including Plan EJ 2014, “a roadmap to assist EPA in
integrating environmental justice into all of the Agency’s
programs, policies, and activities,” and the subsequent EJ
2020 Action Agenda.190 The Agency not only issued guidance related to EJ, but also followed it, including extensively
considering EJ in rulemakings.191 The CPP, for example,
used the term “environmental justice” 46 times.192
In contrast with President Bush’s attempts to decrease
funding for EJ, President Obama sought to slightly increase
funding for EJ enforcement in each of his first six proposed
presidential budgets and then sought to roughly double
funding for FY 2016 and FY 2017, sending a clear signal
that he intended to invest heavily in EJ.193

185. Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10390.
186. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. EPA, to
All EPA Employees (Jan. 12, 2010), https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/bb39e443097b5df5852576a9006a5a86.html.
187. Wilson et al., supra note 7, at 10387 (crediting the Obama Administration
for these actions) (citing U.S. EPA, Guidance on Considering Environmental Justice During the Development of Regulatory Actions
(2015); EPA Activities to Promote Environmental Justice in the Permit Application Process, 78 Fed. Reg. 27220 (May 9, 2013)).
188. Id. at 10388 (citing MOU, supra note 179).
189. U.S. EPA, What Is EJSCREEN?, https://www.epa.gov/ejscreen/whatejscreen (last updated Oct. 28, 2019).
190. U.S. EPA, supra note 16.
191. See supra Section II.B.2.
192. See supra note 171.
193. The proposed presidential budget for FY 2010 was $8.02 million compared
to the $7.8 million enacted for FY 2009. U.S. EPA, FY 2010 Budget in
Brief 58-60 (2009) (EPA-205-S-09-001). For FY 2011, the proposed presidential budget called for $8.12 million compared to the $7.1 million enacted for 2010. U.S. EPA, FY 2011 Budget in Brief 64-65 (2010) (EPA205-S-10-001). For FY 2012, $8 million was proposed compared to the
$7.6 million annualized under the continuing resolution in FY 2011. U.S.
EPA, FY 2012 Budget in Brief 80-84 (2011) (EPA-190-S-11-001). For
FY 2013, $8.01 million was proposed compared to the $7.48 million enacted for 2012. U.S. EPA, FY 2013 Budget in Brief 84-89 (2012) (EPA190-S-12-001). For FY 2014, $7.55 million was proposed compared to
the $7.48 million annualized under the continuing resolution in FY 2013.
U.S. EPA, FY 2014 Budget in Brief 93-97 (2013) (EPA-190-S-13-001).
For FY 2015, the reporting format changed, and no enacted or annualized
budget was reported for FY 2014, but $8.5 million was proposed. U.S.
EPA, FY 2015 Budget in Brief 40 (2014) (EPA-190-S-14-001). For FY
2016, $14.58 million was proposed, compared to the $7.32 million enacted
for FY 2015. U.S. EPA, FY 2016 Budget in Brief 75-78 (2015) (EPA190-S-15-001). For FY 2017, $15.9 million was proposed, compared to the
$7.3 million enacted in 2016. U.S. EPA, FY 2017 Budget in Brief 78-81,
114 (2016) (EPA-190-K-16-002).
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3.	

Trump Era

Under President Trump, certain EJ functions appear to
function in much the same way: the ECRCO continues
to report “new developments” in Title VI complaints,194 a
mobile version of the EJSCREEN tool was rolled out in
2018, and the National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council continues to meet as regularly as it ever did.195 The
EJ IWG, revived under President Obama, also continues to
convene monthly meetings, “though four agencies—DOD
[U.S. Department of Defense], DOE [U.S. Department of
Energy], SBA [U.S. Small Business Administration] and
VA [U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs]—did not attend
any of the monthly meetings during FY 2018, nor did they
participate in any working group committees”; and two
of the agencies—DOD and SBA—did not have a designated representative at all as of March 2019.196 The agencies had various reasons for not maintaining involvement
in the IWG, and according to EPA officials, “it is difficult
to characterize what specific opportunities are missed from
the lack of representation by an agency.”197
EPA officials recognized, however, “that the limiting factor for the working group in its efforts to address the executive order on environmental justice has always been the
will of leadership across federal government to make clear,
measurable commitments of those priorities and to adequately resource the attainment of those commitments.”198
This drop-off in the participation of several agencies may
or may not have a measurable effect on immediate outcomes, but it looks like a signal of a decreased focus on EJ.
At the same time, President Trump has consistently
sought to impose draconian budget cuts on EJ enforcement
specifically, and enforcement generally,199 despite the fact
that “[e]nforcement ensures the same level of protections
across the country, undergirds a credible state enforcement program, drives compliance and innovation, pays for
itself, saves lives, ensures health and prosperity, and creates
jobs.”200 Given that polluting facilities tend to be sited in
or near communities of color and low-income communities, these communities are most likely to be affected not
only by cuts to EJ enforcement, but also to enforcement
generally.201 The president’s first proposed budget sought to
cut the overall enforcement budget by 24%,202 and to com194. U.S. EPA, External Civil Rights Compliance Office—New Developments!,
https://www.epa.gov/ogc/external-civil-rights-compliance-office-new-devel
opments (last updated Nov. 6, 2020).
195. U.S. EPA, National Environmental Justice Advisory Council Meetings, https://
www.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/national-environmental-justice-advisory-council-meetings (last updated Oct. 22, 2020).
196. GAO, supra note 63, at 41.
197. Id. at 42.
198. Id.
199. Environmental Protection Network, Environmental Justice: The
Fair Treatment and Meaningful Involvement of All 2-3 (2017),
https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/
2017/03/Environmental-Justice-Fact-Sheet-519.pdf.
200. Environmental Protection Network, Understanding the Full Impacts of the Proposed FY2020 EPA Budget 12 (2019) [hereinafter EPN
FY2020], https://www.environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/FY2020-Budget-19-pg-Analysis-4.pdf.
201. Outka & Warner, supra note 4, at 406.
202. Environmental Protection Network, Analysis of Trump Administration Proposals for FY2018 Budget for the Environmental
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pletely eliminate the budget for EJ enforcement.203 Each
year since, the president’s proposed budget has sought to
reduce the EJ enforcement budget by at least 70%.204
President Trump has also sought to reduce the total
enforcement budget for environmental programs and
management by 17%, 12%, and 6% for FYs 2019-2021,
respectively,205 even though EPA was already drastically
reducing enforcement and penalties even without budget
cuts.206 The Environmental Protection Network, a group
of former EPA officials who study the impacts of proposed
budget cuts, claimed that the proposed cuts to “programs
that provide environmental protection to low income,
minority and other vulnerable or overburdened communities . . . so disproportionately affect those communities that
there appears to be a conscious decision that they do not
warrant EPA’s attention.”207 Though Congress has notably ignored these recommended cuts, choosing instead to
keep the enforcement budget roughly level since 2016,208
repeated attempts to cripple EPA’s budget for EJ represents
“a pattern that may reflect a deliberate effort to reduce support for those communities.”209

4.	Comparison
This may be the metric by which the Obama Administration’s commitment to EJ is most visible when compared
to both the Bush and Trump Administrations. Not only
did President Obama’s budgets seek to increase, rather
than decrease, spending on EJ enforcement, but EPA during this time undertook new initiatives to bring increased
attention to issues of EJ by implementing tools such as
EJSCREEN and creating the EJ 2014 and EJ 2020 strateProtection Agency 48 (2017) [hereinafter EPN FY2018], https://www.
environmentalprotectionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/Analysisof-Trump-Administration-Proposals-for-FY2018-Budget-for-the-Environmental-Protection-Agency.pdf.
203. From $7.27 million in FY 2017 to $0 for FY 2018. U.S. EPA, FY 2018
Budget in Brief 33-36 (2017) (EPA-190-K-17-001).
204. In FY 2018, the annualized budget for EJ enforcement under a continuing
resolution was $7.24 million, and President Trump proposed cutting it to
$2 million for FY 2019. U.S. EPA, FY 2019 Budget in Brief 49-52 (2018)
(EPA-190-R-18-002) [hereinafter EPA-190-R-18-002]. In FY 2019, the
annualized budget was $7.49 million (again under a continuing resolution),
and President Trump proposed cutting it to $2.74 million for FY 2020. U.S.
EPA, FY 2020 EPA Budget in Brief 59-62 (2019) (EPA-190-R-19-001)
[hereinafter EPA-190-R-19-001]. In 2020, the EJ enforcement budget enacted by Congress increased to $10.19 million, and Trump proposed cutting it to $2.73 million for FY 2021. U.S. EPA, FY 2021 Budget in Brief
77-80 (2020) (EPA-190-S-20-002) [hereinafter EPA-190-S-20-002].
205. From $239 million to $197.28 million for FY 2019, EPA-190-R-18-002,
supra note 204, at 49; from $240.64 million to $211.57 million for FY
2020, EPA-190-R-19-001, supra note 204, at 59; and from $240.64 million
to $225.11 million for FY 2021, EPA-190-S-20-002, supra note 204, at 77.
206. In its analysis of Trump’s proposed budget for FY 2020, the EPN noted that
under Trump, EPA was pursuing “80% fewer civil investigations and the
lowest fines and fewest criminal enforcement cases in a quarter century.”
EPN FY2020, supra note 200, at 12-16.
207. EPN FY2018, supra note 202, at 42.
208. See supra notes 193, 203, and 204 (noting that Congress enacted $7.3 million for FY 2016, $7.27 million for FY 2017, $7.24 million for FY 2018,
$7.49 million for FY 2019, and actually increased the EJ enforcement budget to $10.19 million for FY 2020). As of the time of writing, Congress
had not yet passed a budget for FY 2021 and was instead operating under a
continuing resolution through December 11, 2020. Continuing Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-159, 134 Stat. 709 (2020).
209. EPN FY2020, supra note 200, at 10.
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gic plans. The Administration also demonstrated its commitment to EJ by implementing guidance to help agencies
incorporate EJ in rulemakings and clearly doing so in
EPA’s own rulemakings like the CPP. Some of these signaling actions have continued unchanged during the Trump
Administration,210 but others, such as consideration of EJ
in rulemakings and proposed budgets for EJ enforcement,
have taken a clear U-turn.

5.	

Applying Kuehn’s Taxonomy

What then do these signals mean for justice? Again, the
answer may depend on the notion of justice invoked. Signaling functions themselves may not be said to achieve
much in the way of substantive outcomes that would
advance distributional or corrective justice, but especially when invoked by people or entities in power, they
can lead to the development of new norms that would
advance substantive changes.211 Thus, when such signaling functions are decreased or abandoned, we might say
that distributional and/or corrective justice have been set
back, though not necessarily reversed or destroyed. To
comprehensively evaluate these actions, however, we must
also consider what the implications are for procedural and
social justice.
Signals such as involvement in the IWG or consideration of EJ in rulemakings may to some degree indicate
the degree of attention EJ issues are given, such that less
involvement or lesser consideration may represent less
procedural justice. Actions that signal a lesser commitment to EJ may also, in turn, discourage community
participation in decisionmaking. If the government is
not projecting concern for the issues or explicitly offering
seats at the table, affected communities may be less likely
to believe they will find a place. From a social justice
perspective, actions that signal a lagging commitment
to EJ may invoke a heavy cost. A lagging commitment
may be seen as a failure to recognize the importance of
the issues at hand and an inherent rejection of the economic, racial, and social contexts in which environmental harms occur. In this light, the cause of EJ has been

severely harmed by the change in signals from President
Obama to President Trump.

III. Conclusion
As the analysis above demonstrates, whether EJ has been
advanced or hindered by the policies of the last three
administrations depends in part on the notion of justice
considered. Over the past 20 years, we have gone from an
administration that paid little attention to Title VI administrative claims, ignored the disproportionate impacts of
climate change on low-income communities and communities of color, rejected the principle of differentiated
responsibility for climate change, and signaled no real
commitment to EJ; to an administration that recognized
the failings of the Title VI program and sought to remedy
them, explicitly identified climate change as an EJ issue,
embraced the principle of differentiated responsibility, and
generally signaled a clear commitment to advancing EJ;
and then back to an administration that has failed to carry
forward the momentum built around the Title VI process,
prefers to think of climate change as impacting “all people”
rather than any particular group(s), explicitly rejects the
principle of differentiated responsibility, and signals a flagging commitment to EJ overall.
Applying Kuehn’s taxonomy to the three metrics above
allows a clearer picture to emerge of where progress was
made and lost between the Obama and Trump Administrations, and where things have remained roughly the
same. While it might be said that little was achieved or lost
in the way of actual distributive or corrective justice, much
was gained and lost by way of procedural and social justice.
Viewed in this light, President Trump’s policies might
only have stalled, rather than reversed, progress toward distributive and corrective justice, but they have more clearly
reversed procedural and social justice. Recognizing that EJ
has always been about more than just distributive justice, the
importance of such progress and setbacks is not only that
they move us toward or away from distributive and corrective
justice, but that they reflect forms of justice themselves. How
difficult this damage is to undo remains to be seen.

210. E.g., new developments in Title VI enforcement and the release of the mobile version of EJSCREEN. An EJ 2024 strategic plan had not been released
at the time of writing, but given that the EJ 2020 Action Agenda was not
released until August 2016, an EJ 2024 plan may still be forthcoming.
211. See Madison, supra note 174.
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